Eighty years onward, controversies about the decision to launch the Warsaw Uprising continue. Eminent historian Professor Norman Davies gave an exclusive interview to TVP World where he looked into the feasibility of the uprising and what went wrong, alongside other points.
Professor Davies said that the tragedy of Poland and the resistance movement loyal to the government in exile in London was that it found itself separated from its allies in the West.
“The peculiarity of Poland was that it was a country on the eastern side of Europe, which was obviously going to be liberated by the Red Army, if it was liberated,” said Professor Davies. “But it was allied not with the Soviet Union, but with the West.”
He said: “The peculiarity of the Warsaw Rising was it was the first instance where an ally of the Western powers came into the theater dominated by the Soviet Union. And this is the origin of the tragedy.”
In the modern discourse about the uprising, some argue that expecting the Soviets to come to the insurgents’ assistance was a flawed idea in the first place.
But according to Davies, while “It was certainly a risky idea,” he would not describe it as “flawed.”
As one of the Allies, Poles were expected to participate in the war effort, not only on all the frontlines of the conflict, but also in the liberation of their homeland, and “[w]hen [head of the government in exile, Prime Minister] Mikołajczyk went to see Churchill, [...] they agreed in principle that when the Red Army approached Warsaw, that would be the time for the Germans to be confronted.”
But as Davies points out, the relationship between the London government in exile and Moscow was tense, if a relationship existed at all.
The Soviets invaded Poland together with Germany back in September 1939, and diplomatic contacts were re-established in 1941 following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, but then broken off again in 1943 by the Soviets, when the Poles demanded an explanation regarding the massacre of Polish officers in Katyn.
“They had no relation to the Soviet Union. They could not have prepared the ground properly for the confrontation in Warsaw. And that wasn’t the fault of the Polish government,” Davies said. “They were simply caught in this trap that their political and logistical support came from the West, but their country was on the Eastern front.”
In spite of the horrendous loss of life and the destruction of the city, Davies disagrees with the assessment that the uprising proved “a disaster.”
He said: “Well, I think you can only judge a military operation by its objectives. Poles tend to think that they should have defeated the Wehrmacht. Well, that is absolute nonsense.”
As the historian remarks, the purpose of the uprising was not to defeat the Germans. Rather, “The objective was to hold Warsaw for six days.” But the Uprising held up for a full nine weeks.
As Davies said, “that wasn’t a defeat. In terms of their part in the Allied campaign, the Poles did their task very well, much better than anybody expected.”
“The failure was the failure of the Allied coalition. Churchill called the grand coalition fighting against Hitler, which ought to have mounted a joint operation,” that would bring together the Soviet Red Army, the Polish Home Army, and the Allied air power, but that “didn’t work for a number of reasons.”
One reason was that “The coordination was almost nil. But nobody on the Western side foresaw that Stalin would not cooperate,” and, as Davies himself suspects, “not even Stalin knew how to deal with this situation.”
The historian believes that it was the poor treatment of Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk by the British and U.S. ambassadors to Moscow when the former came to Moscow to meet with the Soviet dictator that made Stalin realize how isolated the Polish leader was and that the Soviets basically had a free hand on the Eastern Front.
Davies does not think it is right to think of the uprising in black-and-white terms: as either a testament to the insurgents’ courage and valor, or as an insane military undertaking.
He said: “I think what is required is an overall view of the rising.”
In terms of carrying out the orders of the Polish government in London, Davies believes that the Home Army “simply had their job to do. And they did it very well.”
“The problems were with the coordination of the Western and Eastern forces,” leading to such situations as the Soviets shooting at Allied planes conducting drops over Warsaw, which Davies was told had been the case by some of the Western Allied crews, who told him they preferred to undertake dangerous return flights over German territory rather than risk flying over the area already under Soviet control.
“The peculiarity of Poland was that it was a country on the eastern side of Europe, which was obviously going to be liberated by the Red Army, if it was liberated,” said Professor Davies. “But it was allied not with the Soviet Union, but with the West.”
He said: “The peculiarity of the Warsaw Rising was it was the first instance where an ally of the Western powers came into the theater dominated by the Soviet Union. And this is the origin of the tragedy.”
In the modern discourse about the uprising, some argue that expecting the Soviets to come to the insurgents’ assistance was a flawed idea in the first place.
But according to Davies, while “It was certainly a risky idea,” he would not describe it as “flawed.”
As one of the Allies, Poles were expected to participate in the war effort, not only on all the frontlines of the conflict, but also in the liberation of their homeland, and “[w]hen [head of the government in exile, Prime Minister] Mikołajczyk went to see Churchill, [...] they agreed in principle that when the Red Army approached Warsaw, that would be the time for the Germans to be confronted.”
But as Davies points out, the relationship between the London government in exile and Moscow was tense, if a relationship existed at all.
The Soviets invaded Poland together with Germany back in September 1939, and diplomatic contacts were re-established in 1941 following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, but then broken off again in 1943 by the Soviets, when the Poles demanded an explanation regarding the massacre of Polish officers in Katyn.
“They had no relation to the Soviet Union. They could not have prepared the ground properly for the confrontation in Warsaw. And that wasn’t the fault of the Polish government,” Davies said. “They were simply caught in this trap that their political and logistical support came from the West, but their country was on the Eastern front.”
How to assess the uprising today?
In spite of the horrendous loss of life and the destruction of the city, Davies disagrees with the assessment that the uprising proved “a disaster.”
He said: “Well, I think you can only judge a military operation by its objectives. Poles tend to think that they should have defeated the Wehrmacht. Well, that is absolute nonsense.”
As the historian remarks, the purpose of the uprising was not to defeat the Germans. Rather, “The objective was to hold Warsaw for six days.” But the Uprising held up for a full nine weeks.
As Davies said, “that wasn’t a defeat. In terms of their part in the Allied campaign, the Poles did their task very well, much better than anybody expected.”
“The failure was the failure of the Allied coalition. Churchill called the grand coalition fighting against Hitler, which ought to have mounted a joint operation,” that would bring together the Soviet Red Army, the Polish Home Army, and the Allied air power, but that “didn’t work for a number of reasons.”
One reason was that “The coordination was almost nil. But nobody on the Western side foresaw that Stalin would not cooperate,” and, as Davies himself suspects, “not even Stalin knew how to deal with this situation.”
The historian believes that it was the poor treatment of Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk by the British and U.S. ambassadors to Moscow when the former came to Moscow to meet with the Soviet dictator that made Stalin realize how isolated the Polish leader was and that the Soviets basically had a free hand on the Eastern Front.
Davies does not think it is right to think of the uprising in black-and-white terms: as either a testament to the insurgents’ courage and valor, or as an insane military undertaking.
He said: “I think what is required is an overall view of the rising.”
In terms of carrying out the orders of the Polish government in London, Davies believes that the Home Army “simply had their job to do. And they did it very well.”
“The problems were with the coordination of the Western and Eastern forces,” leading to such situations as the Soviets shooting at Allied planes conducting drops over Warsaw, which Davies was told had been the case by some of the Western Allied crews, who told him they preferred to undertake dangerous return flights over German territory rather than risk flying over the area already under Soviet control.
“It was the first time, the very first time in the war, that a Western ally had come into conflict with the Red Army,” Davies said.
Source: TVP World
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