A toxic virus of populism is spreading through Central Europe. Populist politicians in Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic share no cohesive ideology and often stand on opposite sides of the political spectrum. However, they share a common desire for absolute power tied to wealth, and have an apparent disdain for the rule of law. With money available in Brussels but their ideal model in Russia, they are caught in a dilemma over which side to choose.
The big question is: have they already decided which mast they want to nail their colors to, while refusing to reveal the decision to voters, believing the time isn’t yet right?
Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister, has no qualms about using the term “leftist” as an insult against his opponents while embracing Slovakia’s leftist prime minister, Robert Fico. Fico, meanwhile, has resorted to demonizing every liberal and vowed to erect a “barrier against liberalism.” But this doesn’t stop him from calling his likely ally, the probable next Czech election winner Andrej Babiš, a friend. This is despite Babiš’s ANO party previously being a member of the liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group in the European Parliament.
It’s easy to lump Central European populists together since they share much of the same rhetoric and have a common enemy (Brussels and migrants). They gravitate toward autocratic regimes in Moscow and Beijing because of shared values. The East would never insist on stronger anti-corruption measures. And the idea of Vladimir Putin conditioning cheap gas supplies on the protection of minority rights or freedom of speech is laughable.
Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister, has no qualms about using the term “leftist” as an insult against his opponents while embracing Slovakia’s leftist prime minister, Robert Fico. Fico, meanwhile, has resorted to demonizing every liberal and vowed to erect a “barrier against liberalism.” But this doesn’t stop him from calling his likely ally, the probable next Czech election winner Andrej Babiš, a friend. This is despite Babiš’s ANO party previously being a member of the liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group in the European Parliament.
It’s easy to lump Central European populists together since they share much of the same rhetoric and have a common enemy (Brussels and migrants). They gravitate toward autocratic regimes in Moscow and Beijing because of shared values. The East would never insist on stronger anti-corruption measures. And the idea of Vladimir Putin conditioning cheap gas supplies on the protection of minority rights or freedom of speech is laughable.
Orbán is the King, and Fico is learning
Though united in their aim to consolidate power at the expense of modern democratic values, Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico differ significantly. Orbán, the undisputed king of Central European populism, has, over the past 14 years, entrenched his power in Hungary with a web of constitutional and institutional safeguards. The challenges faced by Poland’s government under Donald Tusk suggest that even if a new opposition star like Péter Magyar and his Tisza party were to win Hungary’s parliamentary elections, it wouldn’t automatically end the influence of Orbán’s Fidesz.
Fico openly admires Orbán’s government, drawing evident inspiration from Budapest. From conspiracy narratives about George Soros’s malign influence to false rhetoric about a “peaceful solution” for Ukraine, defending Vladimir Putin, proposing a rare transaction tax to shore up public finances and efforts to persecute media and NGOs—all these are originally Hungarian recipes that Fico’s government in Slovakia is adopting.
Yet Robert Fico is not Viktor Orbán. He lacks a coherent ideology, recognition within European political circles, and his ruling coalition is so unstable it can’t even appoint its own parliamentary speaker. Although Fico has held power intermittently since 2006, he has not managed to cement his influence or suppress the opposition, media and NGOs in the same way as Viktor Orbán.
Fico only began fully executing his apparent plan of state capture following the 2023 elections, motivated mainly, it appears, by a desire to ensure impunity for himself and his allies. Despite risking the loss of European funds, he overhauled the country’s criminal policy and dismantled elite police and prosecutorial units, ensuring no police investigator would ever dare investigate or charge him or his close associates as happened in 2022. While this strategy may help him secure impunity, he cannot be certain of victory in the 2027 elections.
Fico openly admires Orbán’s government, drawing evident inspiration from Budapest. From conspiracy narratives about George Soros’s malign influence to false rhetoric about a “peaceful solution” for Ukraine, defending Vladimir Putin, proposing a rare transaction tax to shore up public finances and efforts to persecute media and NGOs—all these are originally Hungarian recipes that Fico’s government in Slovakia is adopting.
Yet Robert Fico is not Viktor Orbán. He lacks a coherent ideology, recognition within European political circles, and his ruling coalition is so unstable it can’t even appoint its own parliamentary speaker. Although Fico has held power intermittently since 2006, he has not managed to cement his influence or suppress the opposition, media and NGOs in the same way as Viktor Orbán.
Fico only began fully executing his apparent plan of state capture following the 2023 elections, motivated mainly, it appears, by a desire to ensure impunity for himself and his allies. Despite risking the loss of European funds, he overhauled the country’s criminal policy and dismantled elite police and prosecutorial units, ensuring no police investigator would ever dare investigate or charge him or his close associates as happened in 2022. While this strategy may help him secure impunity, he cannot be certain of victory in the 2027 elections.
Babiš is a businessman
The Central European populist family, under the banner of the European “Patriots for Europe” group, now officially includes Czech ANO party leader Andrej Babiš, alongside figures like Orbán and Austria’s Herbert Kickl (FPÖ). A man without a clear ideology or political program, Babiš is, at heart, a businessman, and he has finally chosen his political camp. He senses that this path is the best way to maximize his electoral success. In this company, he can engage in fear-mongering about migrants and warn about deploying Czech soldiers to Ukraine. He knows it works with his voters.
Babiš admires Orbán and has even invited him to join his campaign events. But unlike the leaders of Hungary and Slovakia, Babiš is primarily a businessman, prioritizing the interests of companies within his sphere of influence. He is fully aware that EU funds come from Brussels, and his pro-Russian stance remains mostly rhetorical, a tool for election campaigns rather than a fundamental policy shift.
The relationship with Russia is a significant dividing line among Central European populists, especially when members of Poland’s right-wing opposition PiS party are included. These are known for their anti-Russian rhetoric, which stands in stark contrast to their peers in Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.
Amid the hybrid warfare waged by Moscow against the EU, the legitimization of Russian propaganda is perhaps the greatest danger these Central European populists bring.
From this perspective, one positive factor is that the most authentically pro-Russian among them is Fico, who holds limited influence on the European stage. As a young man in 1986, he joined the Communist Party, unbothered by the authoritarian regime’s moral failings, and he approaches Putin’s Russia with the same cynicism today.
Babiš admires Orbán and has even invited him to join his campaign events. But unlike the leaders of Hungary and Slovakia, Babiš is primarily a businessman, prioritizing the interests of companies within his sphere of influence. He is fully aware that EU funds come from Brussels, and his pro-Russian stance remains mostly rhetorical, a tool for election campaigns rather than a fundamental policy shift.
Relationship with Russia
The relationship with Russia is a significant dividing line among Central European populists, especially when members of Poland’s right-wing opposition PiS party are included. These are known for their anti-Russian rhetoric, which stands in stark contrast to their peers in Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.
Amid the hybrid warfare waged by Moscow against the EU, the legitimization of Russian propaganda is perhaps the greatest danger these Central European populists bring.
From this perspective, one positive factor is that the most authentically pro-Russian among them is Fico, who holds limited influence on the European stage. As a young man in 1986, he joined the Communist Party, unbothered by the authoritarian regime’s moral failings, and he approaches Putin’s Russia with the same cynicism today.
Fico exploits a pro-Russian sentiment held by many Slovaks, claiming Europe “falsely demonizes” Putin, and prioritizes the restoration of good relations with Russia. It’s clear he’s serious about this stance.
In this light, the differences between Fico and Orbán are stark. While Fico claims he “didn’t even notice the revolution in 1989,” Orbán, then a young democrat, was calling for the Soviet Red Army to leave Hungary, calling passionately for an end to communist tyranny.
Orbán’s pivot from liberal politics to authoritarianism with a pro-Russian tone is largely pragmatic, as it helps him secure electoral victories. Unlike Slovakia, Hungarians don’t have historical affinities toward Russia, but instead harbor grievances and feelings of isolation in Europe. This makes it easier for Orbán to cast the “West” as antagonistic and to propose alliances with the East, which align better with Hungarian (or rather, Orbán’s) interests.
How capable are Central European populists of uniting around shared goals, such as reducing the power of the EU to the economic realm and the reestablishment of normalized political and economic relations with Russia? Their potential is undeniable, as underscored during a recent meeting between Fico, Orbán, and Aleksandar Vučić, the president of Serbia, in Komárno, Slovakia.
In this light, the differences between Fico and Orbán are stark. While Fico claims he “didn’t even notice the revolution in 1989,” Orbán, then a young democrat, was calling for the Soviet Red Army to leave Hungary, calling passionately for an end to communist tyranny.
Orbán’s pivot from liberal politics to authoritarianism with a pro-Russian tone is largely pragmatic, as it helps him secure electoral victories. Unlike Slovakia, Hungarians don’t have historical affinities toward Russia, but instead harbor grievances and feelings of isolation in Europe. This makes it easier for Orbán to cast the “West” as antagonistic and to propose alliances with the East, which align better with Hungarian (or rather, Orbán’s) interests.
What is the goal?
How capable are Central European populists of uniting around shared goals, such as reducing the power of the EU to the economic realm and the reestablishment of normalized political and economic relations with Russia? Their potential is undeniable, as underscored during a recent meeting between Fico, Orbán, and Aleksandar Vučić, the president of Serbia, in Komárno, Slovakia.
The leaders noted their influence, particularly on issues like EU migration policy, where they’ve long rejected solutions based on solidarity among member states, advocating instead for preventing migrants from reaching European soil—a stance now becoming a reality.
However, it would be wrong to overestimate their impact given their differing motivations and domestic circumstances. Evidence lies in their inability to form a unified Eurosceptic group in the European Parliament. Even in Komárno, Orbán dodged a journalist’s question on whether they were forming a Danube-populist bloc as an alternative to the V4.
The fact remains that if Fico and Orbán were to embark on a dangerous path toward leaving the EU within a decade or so, their policies would likely look much as they do now. Fortunately, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic remain democracies where power lies with the people, and public opinion in these countries still strongly supports EU membership.
Political leaders, however, wield significant influence over public opinion and can even manipulate it to achieve the previously unthinkable. Sometimes, all it takes is time and the right moment. The British could tell many stories about that…
However, it would be wrong to overestimate their impact given their differing motivations and domestic circumstances. Evidence lies in their inability to form a unified Eurosceptic group in the European Parliament. Even in Komárno, Orbán dodged a journalist’s question on whether they were forming a Danube-populist bloc as an alternative to the V4.
The fact remains that if Fico and Orbán were to embark on a dangerous path toward leaving the EU within a decade or so, their policies would likely look much as they do now. Fortunately, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic remain democracies where power lies with the people, and public opinion in these countries still strongly supports EU membership.
Political leaders, however, wield significant influence over public opinion and can even manipulate it to achieve the previously unthinkable. Sometimes, all it takes is time and the right moment. The British could tell many stories about that…
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