Fico’s Article 5 warning lands as Europe worries that Moscow could use a murky provocation to split NATO, giving the alliance a unity problem before any attack has even happened. European leaders are warning that Vladimir Putin may be preparing a hybrid attack on NATO territory. The strike could be disguised as an accident, leaving allies arguing over who was responsible and whether Article 5 should apply. The purpose would be to show that NATO’s promise of collective defense is more theoretical than real. They did not have to wait long for the first crack. Russia has yet to stage the feared attack, yet Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico is already explaining why his country might stay out of the resulting conflict. His comments mark an escalation. Fico has spent years criticizing sanctions, opposing military aid to Ukraine and repeating arguments that suit Moscow. Now he is questioning the central commitment holding NATO together. Sovereignty-maxxing has long been Fico’s method: keep the protection, money and influence that come with Western membership while claiming maximum national freedom over whether its obligations apply. What has changed is the pressure at home. His government is struggling with unpopular economic measures, while the far-right Republika movement is closing in on his populist left-wing party Smer. That gives Fico a powerful reason to sound increasingly hostile towards Ukraine, suspicious of NATO and accommodating towards Russia. Fico is rehearsing Slovakia’s excuse Speaking in Prešov, the country’s third-largest city, Fico asked his audience to imagine Slovakia being told to prepare thousands of soldiers following the activation of NATO’s collective-defense clause. “I do not want Slovakia to be part of any military conflict because of some Article 5,” he said. “As prime minister, I will do everything to ensure that Slovakia is never drawn into a military conflict.” He later said the war in Ukraine was neither Slovakia’s war nor NATO’s war. He accused “certain war hawks within NATO” of trying to provoke a conflict with Russia and promised that Slovak soldiers would not fight under a “fabricated pretext”. Czech President Petr Pavel, a former chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, called the remarks “extremely serious”. “If anyone says that they are glad to be a member of NATO, in other words that NATO protects us, but at the same time is unwilling to participate if anyone else is attacked, then they have not understood the word ‘solidarity,’” Pavel said. Fico responded by turning the disagreement into his familiar choice between peace and war. “I respect that Czech President Petr Pavel, as a former NATO general, would like to fight,” he said. “I would therefore welcome it if he respected that I prefer peace.” Andrej Babiš took a different line. The Czech prime minister, who is hardly a Brussels-approved Atlanticist and has his own disputes over defense spending, clearly backed the alliance and, specifically, Poland. “Poland is in a different situation because the war in Ukraine is taking place in its immediate vicinity,” Babiš said. “If something happens, of course we will help Poland in accordance with Article 5.” The thing is, Fico is correct about one narrow point. Article 5 does not automatically require every ally to send troops. Each member must provide assistance through “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”. The precise contribution remains a national decision. What matters here is the signal. Fico is getting his excuse in early before an attack has happened, before the evidence has been examined and before Slovakia has been asked to contribute anything. Deterrence depends on Moscow believing that the allies will resolve those questions together in a spirit of alliance solidarity. Fico’s comments damage that solidarity in advance. Sovereignty-maxxing in four directions Fico’s Article 5 remarks go further than his previous positions. Even so, the instinct behind them fits a foreign-policy approach that has become more pronounced during his fourth term in office. He calls it a policy towards “all four directions of the world”. Slovakia remains in the EU and NATO while cultivating Russia, China, Turkey and other states willing to offer diplomatic or economic opportunities. Fico is one of only a handful of EU heads of government to have travelled to Moscow and met Putin since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He ended bilateral state military aid to Ukraine, opposes Ukrainian membership of NATO and has questioned Kyiv’s ability to recover its occupied territory. He has even claimed that the war began in 2014 with the actions of “Ukrainian fascists”. At the same time, Slovakia buys American F-16 fighters and Black Hawk helicopters. US company Westinghouse is favored for its nuclear expansion, while Russian participation has been rejected. Fico supports Ukraine joining the EU, maintains practical cooperation with Kyiv and allows Slovak companies to sell ammunition and weapons to the Ukrainian military. In practice, the contradictions give him room to maneuver. He can meet Putin, then meet Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as he did in September last year in Uzhhorod. He can attack sanctions, block them temporarily and eventually let them pass after extracting concessions, as he did in July 2025, when Slovakia lifted its block on the EU’s eighteenth sanctions package after receiving energy-security assurances from the European Commission. Slovakia has also used the renewal of sanctions to press for the removal of Alisher Usmanov, after Turkey and Central Asian states asked Fico to intervene on the Russian-Uzbek billionaire’s behalf. Fico wants every side to believe that Slovakia could be useful. He also wants Slovak voters to see him forcing larger countries to negotiate. Republika explains the escalation Foreign policy alone does not explain his increasingly radical language. Domestic polling does. A September NMS poll put Fico’s Smer on 16.2%. The far-right Republika movement was just behind on 15.6%. One fifth of Smer’s 2023 voters had moved to Republika, which is also drawing support from Fico’s coalition partners, the nominally center-left Hlas and the ultranationalist, pro-Russian Slovak National Party. Fico's coalition has also lost much of his moderate electorate. Many of those voters followed the now President Peter Pellegrini when he founded Hlas as a calmer version of Smer. Hlas has since joined Fico’s government, lost its distinct identity and fallen to 6.4%, close to Slovakia’s 5% parliamentary threshold. Fico campaigns as Smer faces pressure from Republika, the far-right challenger drawing voters with nationalist and pro-Russian appeals. That leaves Fico fighting Republika for nationalist, anti-American and Russia-friendly voters. An Ipsos survey conducted in 2024 found that 35% of Smer supporters wanted Russia to win the war, while only 5% preferred a Ukrainian victory. Support for remaining in NATO is almost matched by support for leaving it. The pressure is growing because the government’s economic record is unpopular. VAT has risen from 20 to 23%, businesses have faced a financial-transactions tax and austerity has squeezed household budgets. That is why Fico would rather fight the parliamentary election due in September 2027 over peace, sovereignty and foreign interference. Republika cannot easily outflank him if he sounds more suspicious of NATO, more hostile towards Ukraine and more willing to confront Brussels than they do. The strategy may help Fico hold his electorate. It also gives Putin precisely the argument he wants. Provocations work when allies dispute who attacked them, whether the attack was serious and what solidarity requires. Fico has begun raising all three doubts before Russia has even pulled the trigger.
