Turkey and Russia appear to be entering what one analyst calls “the start of something,” as mounting maritime disputes and shifting energy priorities expose deeper strains in their long-standing transactional partnership. The recent denial of docking rights for Russia’s cruise liner Astoria Grande, which spent the night drifting off Istanbul’s coast, triggered immediate accusations of “revenge” from Russian media. Just days earlier, Russia had blocked a Turkish ferry from entering Sochi, forcing the cancellation of the reopening of the Trabzon–Sochi route after 14 years. The incidents remain officially unexplained but have heightened uncertainty in the Black Sea at a moment of rising geopolitical tension. At the heart of this friction lies Turkey’s gradual shift away from Russian energy dominance. Although still reliant on gas delivered via the TurkStream pipeline, Ankara is intensifying diversification efforts, from new LNG contracts to reviving the Sinop nuclear project with U.S. and South Korean partners. For Moscow, such shifts signal erosion of influence; for Ankara, they represent strategic autonomy and national security. One prominent observer, Professor Kıvanç Ulusoy of Istanbul University, told TVP World’s Eastern Express that these developments are unlikely to remain isolated. “I think it’s the start of something,” he said. “As long as Turkey sides with Ukraine in the war, tension is supposed to increase.” He added that Ankara’s enforcement of the Montreux Convention has been a crucial and often underappreciated stabilizing factor: “Turkey has strong leverage on Russia because of the proper implementation of the Montreux Convention.” Yet, Ulusoy said that Turkey’s position remains delicate. “There is no point for Turkey to confront Russia because of the war in Ukraine,” he said, arguing both sides still want to avoid rupture. “Russia does not want to lose Turkey completely to the West.” For now, the Black Sea is becoming a zone where commercial disputes, energy realignment, and wartime security pressures increasingly intersect and where the Ankara–Moscow balance looks more fragile than at any recent point.
