There won’t be a Czexit, but probably no UkraJoin either. What we’re seeing in the Czech Republic is populism 2.0, Andrej Babiš’s plug-and-play version of power built on deals rather than ideology. It is disruption, not revolution, politics that stays safely inside the EU tent while bending its shape from within. President Petr Pavel, the former NATO general who defeated Babiš in last year’s presidential race, said he was pleased that voters “chose a Western path.” But pro-EU forces shouldn’t take too much comfort. The fact that the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the far-left Stačilo! alliance performed below expectations doesn’t mean the populist tide has receded. It has simply consolidated around Babiš. ANO’s triumph is not a rejection of populism but its refinement. Populism 2.0 The government of Petr Fiala was supposed to mark the start of a post-populist era in Central Europe, proving that technocratic competence could outlast resentment politics. Donald Tusk’s return to power in Poland in 2023 looked, at the time, like a confirmation of that trend, a sign that liberal, pro-EU forces were regaining the initiative. But less than two years later, Tusk’s coalition is struggling with internal divisions, declining support and growing fatigue among voters. The same pattern has now played out in Prague. Fiala’s government left voters disillusioned and paved the way for a return of populism. Predictions of a post-populist turn now look stillborn, and Babiš’s return shows how effectively populism can survive by adapting. Coalition calculations The outcome of the October 3–4 election to the Czech Republic’s Chamber of Deputies, the lower house, now points to a minority government led by Andrej Babiš’s ANO (“Action of Dissatisfied Citizens”), his centrist-populist movement built around his personal brand. Such a government would rely on the tacit support of the SPD, led by Tomio Okamura, and the anti-Green Deal protest group Motorists for Themselves (Motoristé sobě), led by Petr Macinka. Both parties could back ANO in parliamentary votes of confidence and on key legislation, giving Babiš working control without formal coalition partners. Pavel has met all party leaders but has held off giving Babiš a mandate to form a government, calling it “too early” until a viable majority takes shape. Indications are that we won’t know what the new government will look like until early November. He has made clear that the next cabinet must keep the Czech Republic anchored in the West, saying, “Until we have another, better alternative, it would be irresponsible to talk about abandoning the EU and NATO.” In their post-election meeting, Pavel said Babiš had shown him several ways to resolve his conflict of interest with Agrofert “in accordance with the letter of the law.” Agrofert, Babiš’s company, is one of Central Europe’s largest agri-food conglomerates and a major recipient of EU subsidies, a situation that has long placed Babiš on a collision course with Brussels over misuse of public funds. He also faces revived fraud charges over the “Stork’s Nest” case, involving EU development money. Any trial would require parliament to lift his immunity. In practice, however, the contours of the future government are already visible: both the SPD and Motorists have signaled their willingness to back Babiš in exchange for influence. The SPD wants parliamentary posts, such as deputy speaker roles, committee chairs, and oversight positions, and state-owned company positions. The Motorists are pushing for seats at the environment and labor ministries. What’s emerging is plug-and-play populism, a model where everyone gets something as long as there’s something in it for Babiš. Record victory ANO secured 34.5% of the vote, its highest result since the party was founded in 2011, winning around 1.9 million ballots compared to 1.5 million in 2021. That translates into roughly 80 seats in the 200-member Chamber of Deputies. The scale places it as the second-strongest single-party showing in Czech history after the Communists’ win in 1946. The governing Spolu coalition (“Together”)—a three-party, center-right alliance of Civic Democrats (ODS), Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), and the liberal conservative TOP 09—fell to 23% from 27% in 2021, a result that in previous elections would even have given the party a chance of forming a government. The centrist Mayors and Independents (STAN), which props up the governing coalition, reached 11% and the liberal Pirates, which used to be part of the government but left in October 2024, received 9%. The SPD took 7.8%, well below the 13% it had been polling only weeks earlier, and the Motorists entered parliament with 6.7%. The Stačilo! (“Enough”) alliance, a pro-Russian coalition led by the Communists, fell short of the 5% threshold with just 4.3%, a shock result that kept the extremist bloc out of the chamber. Their result seemed to confirm President Pavel’s view that “the majority of citizens do not want extreme views.” Turnout reached 68.9%, the highest in 20 years, but the surge favored Babiš rather than the anti-system fringes. At ANO headquarters, Babiš called his solid victory “the culmination of my political career.” No Czexit, No UkraJoin The Czech Republic is not leaving the European Union or NATO, a possibility that consumed international media coverage before the election, but its tone toward both will cool, and its priorities will narrow to national interest. Czechia’s outgoing government under Fiala was one of Kyiv’s strongest allies, sending tanks and howitzers, and leading a multinational scheme to buy artillery shells for Ukraine on world markets. Babiš has promised to end this initiative. He has also questioned the €5 billion deal for 24 U.S. F-35 fighter jets and the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP on defense, calling instead for “efficiency first.” At the same time, he has said he will not interfere with Czech arms companies that continue to sell weapons and ammunition to Ukraine on a commercial basis. His message is “Czech interests first.” Babiš’s approach is pragmatic, not ideological. As Czech political scientist Eva Klusová said in a recent interview in Polish media: “You can say many bad things about Babiš—that he has no convictions and no conscience—but not that he stands on Russia’s side.” Let’s recall that as prime minister in 2021, he ordered the expulsion of 18 Russian diplomats identified as intelligence officers after Czech investigators linked Moscow’s military intelligence agency to the 2014 explosions at an ammunition depot in Vrbětice, the largest expulsion of Russian agents in Czech history. Czech analysts frequently point out that his business group, Agrofert, has no operations in Russia and depends heavily on EU subsidies and Western markets. They say he is unlikely to rush to Moscow, and his tone on foreign policy is likely to be cautious and transactional, with talk of “sovereignty” and “normal relations” with all sides. The second coming Ivan Krastev, a political scientist, sees what’s happening in the Czech Republic as part of a wider European drift. Populists, he argues, no longer promise revolution but manage discontent from within the system. He wrote in Prospect magazine recently: “It is more difficult for populist parties to come to power for the first time than to return to office.” Babiš’s comeback proves the point. The Czech Republic now joins a Central European bloc of governing populists: Orbán in Hungary, Fico in Slovakia, and possibly Law and Justice again in Poland come the next election; all staying inside the EU tent while tugging its center to the right and normalizing the politics of control. What Babiš will do in office is still uncertain, but early signs point to a familiar pattern. His party has already floated plans to “reform” public broadcasting, merge Czech Television and Czech Radio, and bring their funding under direct government oversight. ANO politicians have also talked about tightening rules for NGOs receiving foreign grants and revisiting elements of the EU’s Green Deal. None of this would mark a full break with liberal democracy, but it would narrow civic space and shift the country toward a softer, more technocratic version of the illiberal politics that are a feature of the region. Next month, Babiš is due in Brussels for a summit of the “Patriots for Europe,” the new far-right alliance in the European Parliament founded this summer by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Austria’s Herbert Kickl, and Babiš himself. It brings together nationalist and Eurosceptic parties opposed to the EU’s Green Deal, migration policy and support for Ukraine. It will be Babiš’s first meeting with the group as a returning head of government, not an outsider railing against the EU, but a member reshaping it from within.
